The CCB Was Created to Give Small Creators Access to Justice. So Why Can Companies Simply Opt Out?

Disclaimer: As usual, I am not an attorney or intellectual property professional. This article reflects my personal opinions and observations as a photographer, artist, and small business owner whose copyrighted work has been infringed multiple times. It is not legal advice.

I believe the Copyright Claims Board can be a better option than federal court. But in certain cases.

I've used it, I'm currently using it, and I think its creation was one of the most meaningful attempts in years to make copyright enforcement accessible to independent creators.

But there are a few parts of the system that I increasingly struggle to understand. One is:

Why is participation optional?

The Copyright Claims Board, or CCB, was created under the CASE Act to provide a lower-cost, streamlined alternative to federal copyright litigation.

That was desperately needed.

For years, creators have faced an absurd economic problem....

If someone infringed, you had to have paid and registered your work with the copyright office in order to FILE the federal lawsuit.

So, if you can't afford to register everything you create, you register when you want to sue, and not only will you have to wait weeks to months to have the registration approved, if you didn't register before the infringement, you can't get statutory damages (up to $150,000 per work) and attorney's fees if you don't register first.

Then, you have to pay hundreds to file the complaint, and most likely you'll have to hire an attorney because FEDERAL COURT and PRO SE isn't easy. And in some cases depending on how you file, you're required to have an attorney.

I have spent thousands of dollars on registering my images. I have over 12,000 registered images in 2026.

I have spent hundreds of thousands in attorneys fees. LITERALLY.

How is this possible for the average IP holder?

Someone might infringe a photographer's registered work and cause several thousand dollars in damages, but pursuing that claim in federal court could cost tens of thousands of dollars or more.

So....

You can own the copyright.

You can have evidence.

You can have a legitimate claim.

And still be economically unable to enforce it.

ENTER: THE CCB.

The CCB was supposed to help close that gap.

Except there's a catch and spoiler alert: It benefits the big companies mostly.

The Respondent Can Simply Opt Out

A copyright owner can file a CCB claim.

Pay the filing fee.

Prepare the evidence.

Locate the respondent.

Pay to have them properly served.

And then the respondent can say:

No thanks.

Under the CASE Act, respondents generally have 60 days after proper service to opt out of the proceeding.

If they do, the CCB case ends.

BOOM. BYE.

Go to federal court now and spend that money you were trying to avoid spending.

Which is exactly where many small creators couldn't afford to go in the first place.

That's the part I think most big companies know, and abuse. In fact, I've filed several CCB actions against BIG BIG companies and nearly all have OPTED OUT. Others have simply ignored it.

That fact should concern the CCB.

Cue "What was I made for......"

Why Should Copyright Small Claims Be Optional?

If someone files a legitimate civil action against you in a court that has jurisdiction, you generally don't get to simply opt out because you don't feel like participating.

You defend yourself.

You challenge jurisdiction if appropriate.

You present evidence.

You assert defenses.

You settle.

You win.

You lose.

There is a legal process.

The CCB works differently because Congress created it as a voluntary tribunal within the U.S. Copyright Office rather than as an Article III federal court. The opt-out mechanism was deliberately included in the CASE Act, in part because of the constitutional rights involved when legal disputes are decided outside the traditional federal judiciary.

I understand why the system was constructed that way.

What I'm questioning is whether that was the right structure in the first place.

Because if constitutional concerns require the CCB itself to remain voluntary, perhaps the larger conversation shouldn't be about tweaking the opt-out provision.

Maybe we should be talking about creating a true federal copyright small-claims process where participation isn't optional.

The Power Imbalance Is Hard to Ignore

Imagine an independent photographer discovers that a registered photograph has been used commercially without permission.

The photographer sends a notice.

Nothing.

Another notice.

Nothing.

They escalate the matter.

Nothing.

They send a demand attempting to resolve it privately.

Nothing.

Finally, they file with the CCB because spending tens of thousands of dollars on federal litigation isn't realistic.

They gather their evidence.

They prepare their claim.

They pay the filing fee.

They pay for service.

The respondent is served.

And then a large corporate respondent with vastly greater financial and legal resources simply opts out.

"No thanks, I don't feel like being sued."

No hearing.

No examination of the evidence.

No determination of whether infringement occurred.

Now the photographer has a choice.

Spend potentially tens of thousands of dollars pursuing a relatively modest copyright claim in federal court...

or give up.

Who benefits from that structure?

Certainly not the person the CCB was created to help.

When Stonewalling Becomes Economically Rational

This concerns me even more when dealing with large companies.

A major corporation can have internal legal departments, outside counsel, automated copyright reporting systems, customer service departments, vendors and multiple layers of bureaucracy separating an individual creator from someone who can actually resolve an infringement claim.

Meanwhile, the creator is spending their own time.

Another notice.

Another email.

Another escalation.

Another demand.

Another hour documenting evidence.

Another hour not creating.

Then the creator finally turns to the legal system designed specifically for smaller copyright disputes.

And the company can opt out.

At some point, the system risks rewarding the party with the greatest ability to wait the other side out.

A corporation may be perfectly comfortable litigating in federal court.

An independent photographer probably isn't.

And large companies know that.

They know federal litigation is expensive.

They know many small creators represent themselves.

They know a $5,000 or $10,000 claim may become economically irrational to pursue if the only remaining option requires tens of thousands of dollars in legal expenses.

Whether intentional or not, the result can be the same:

The creator goes away.

That's Not Meaningful Access to Justice

It's easy to respond:

"But the creator can still sue in federal court."

Technically, yes.

Practically?

That's a very different conversation.

Federal litigation can involve filing fees, attorney fees, discovery, depositions, experts, motion practice and years of litigation.

Telling an independent creator with a relatively modest copyright claim that they remain free to spend $30,000 pursuing $5,000 in damages isn't meaningful access to justice.

It's a right that exists on paper but may be economically impossible to exercise.

And wasn't that exactly the problem the CCB was created to solve?

Maybe We Need a Real Copyright Small-Claims Court

I'm not suggesting defendants shouldn't have rights.

Of course they should.

A respondent should be able to challenge the claim.

Challenge jurisdiction.

Present evidence.

Challenge damages.

Hire an attorney.

Seek appropriate review.

Due process matters regardless of whether the person bringing the claim is an individual photographer or a multinational corporation.

But due process and an automatic escape hatch are not necessarily the same thing.

If constitutional limitations prevent Congress from simply making the existing CCB mandatory, then perhaps we should be having a larger conversation about creating a federal copyright small-claims mechanism designed from the beginning to provide the necessary constitutional protections.

One where participation isn't optional.

One where relatively modest copyright disputes can actually be decided on their merits.

One where the size of someone's bank account doesn't determine whether their copyright is enforceable.

I Want to Know How Often This Is Happening

I'd also like to see data.

How frequently are CCB respondents opting out?

More importantly, who is opting out?

How often are large corporate respondents opting out of claims brought by individual creators?

And what happens afterward?

Do those creators file federal lawsuits?

Do they settle?

Or do those claims simply disappear because the creator can't afford to continue?

That last question may be the most important one.

If creators with otherwise viable copyright claims routinely abandon them after respondents opt out, then we need to acknowledge what that means.

The CCB may be functioning exactly as Congress designed it while still failing to completely solve the problem Congress created it to address.

That's something worth studying.

Give the CCB More Teeth

I don't think the answer is abandoning the Copyright Claims Board.

Quite the opposite.

The CCB is important enough that we should be willing to identify its weaknesses and strengthen it.

The Copyright Office's recent review of the CASE Act has already identified areas where creators are struggling, including service of process and the complexity of navigating the system without attorneys.

That's what should happen with a relatively new legal process.

Use it.

Study it.

Find the weaknesses.

Fix them.

And keep improving it.

But I believe the opt-out provision deserves to be part of that conversation.

Maybe Congress can give the CCB greater authority.

Maybe certain categories of claims should be handled differently.

Maybe repeat corporate respondents deserve additional scrutiny.

Or maybe the ultimate solution is something bigger:

A true federal copyright small-claims court.

I don't pretend to know what the perfect legislative framework looks like.

But I know what the problem looks like.

A Copyright Shouldn't Be Worth More When Its Owner Has More Money

Copyright protection shouldn't depend on whether the person who owns the copyright can afford federal litigation.

A photographer working from a home studio owns the same kind of copyright as a multinational corporation.

An independent illustrator's work isn't less worthy of protection because they don't have an in-house legal department.

A writer shouldn't have to spend more enforcing a copyright than the infringement itself is worth.

And a billion-dollar company shouldn't effectively have greater ability to avoid adjudication simply because it can afford the forum that the individual creator cannot.

The CCB was created because Congress recognized this problem.

That's why I support it.

That's also why I want it to have more power.

Because if the Copyright Claims Board exists to give small creators meaningful access to copyright enforcement, then the parties with the deepest pockets shouldn't be able to close that door simply by checking a box and pointing the creator toward federal court.

Give the CCB more teeth.

And if the existing CCB cannot constitutionally be made mandatory, then maybe it's time to ask a bigger question:

Why don't we?